IN 2008, 52 BABIES WERE NAMED "BARACK" AFTER CELEBRITY IN CHIEF BARRY O. IN 2009, 69 WERE. THESE DAYS NO ONE REALLY DOES.
BUT BARRY O SHOULDN'T FRET, THESE REPORTERS UNDERSTAND MILLIONS OF KIDS ARE STILL, LIKE BARRY O, NICKNAMED "DUMB ASS" EVERY YEAR.
FROM THE TCI WIRE:
"First," declared US House Rep Jason Chaffetz yesterday morning explaining the purpose of the
Committee, "Americans have the right to know that the money Washington takes from them is well spent. And second Americans deserve efficient, effective government that works for them. Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to protect these rights."
Chaffetz is the Chair of the House Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations which held a hearing on Iraq.
Appearing before the Subcommittee on the first panel were: US State Dept's Patrick Kennedy, Peter Verga and USAID's Mara Rudman. Panel two was the US Government Accountability Office's Michael Courts, the State Dept's Acting Inspecting General Harold Geisel, DoD's Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia Mickey McDermott, USAID's Deputy Inspector General Michael Carroll and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen Jr.
There are approximately 2,000 direct-hire personnel and 14,000 support contractors
-- roughly a seven-to-one ratio. This includes 7,000 private security contractors to
guard our facilities and move personnel throughout Iraq. Leading up to the withdrawal,
the State Dept's mission seemed clear. Ambassador Patrick Kennedy testified that the diplomatic mission was "designed to maximize influence in key locations." And later
said, "State will continue the police development programs moving beyond basic
policing skills to provide police forces with the capabilities to uphold the rule of law.
The Office of Security Cooperation will help close gaps in Iraq's security forces
capabilities through security assistance and cooperation." This is an unprecedented
mission for the State Dept. Nonetheless, our diplomatic corps has functioned without
the protections of a typical host nation. It's also carried on without troop support that
many believed it would have. As a result, the Embassy spends roughly 93% of its budget
on security alone. Without a doubt, this is an enormously complex and difficult mission. Six months into the transition, the Congress must assess whether the administration
is accomplishing its mission? While the State Dept has made progress, it appears to be
facing difficult challenges in a number of areas. The Oversight Committee has offered
some criticism based on their testimony today. Including the Government Accountability Office noting that the State and Defense Dept's security capabilities are not finalized.
The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction states that, "Thousands of
projects completed by the United States and transferred to the government of Iraq
will not be sustained and thus will fail to meet their intended purposes." The Defense
Dept's Inspector General's Office explains that the lack of Status of Forces Agreement
has impacted land use agreements, force protection, passport visa requirements, air
and ground movement and our foreign military sales program. And the US AID Inspector General's office testifies, "According to US AID mission, the security situation has
hampered its ability to monitor programs. Mission personnel are only occassionaly
able to travel to the field for site visits." Embassy personnel have also told Committee
staff that the United States government has difficulty registering its vehicles with the
Iraqi government and Iraqis have stood up checkpoints along supply lines. According
to one embassy official, the team must dispatch a liason to "have tea and figure out
how we're going to get our trucks through." These are just some of the challenges
the State Dept is facing in Iraq today. Perhaps as a result of these conditions, Mission
Iraq appears to be evolving. In an effort to be more efficient, the State Dept is evaluating
its footprint, reducing personnel and identifying possible reductions. This rapid change
in strategy, however, raises a number of questions. Are we on the right track? Are we redefining the mission? What should we expect in the coming months? And, in hindsight, was this a well managed withdrawal?
The first panel was a joke in so many ways. Someone please convey to the State Dept that they
don't look 'manly' offering football allusions to Iraq. With all the people -- Iraqis, Americans, etc. -- it's really beyond insensitive for State to show up and try to talk football. There have been far too many deaths for anyone to see this as a game or match and you'd think the diplomatic arm of the government would grasp that on their own and wouldn't need that pointed out. In addition to the unneeded sports comparisons and examples, there were also the answers which could be honest only if you agreed to ignore the facts. US House Rep Blake Farenthold became Acting Chair where we're doing our excerpt.
Acting Chair Blake Farenthold: I just have one more question so we'll just do a quick
second round of questions. Ambassador Kennedy, you mentioned the Baghdad police
college annex facility as one of the facilities. It's my understanding that the United States' taxpayers have invested more than $100 million in improvements on that site. It was intended to house the police department program -- a multi-billion dollar effort that's
currently being downsized. And as a result of the State Dept's failure to secure land use rights the entire facility is being turned over to the Iraqis at no cost. The GAO reports
Mission Iraq has land use agreements or leases for only 5 out of all of the sites that it operates. Can you say with confidence that those sites now operating without leases or agreements will not be turned over to Iraq for free as was the case with the police development program? And what would the cost to the US taxpayer be if they were to
lose without compensation all of those facilities?
Patrick Kennedy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the statement that has been --
that you were reading from about we are closing the Baghdad police development center because of a failure to have land use rights is simply factually incorrect. We have a land
use agreement for that site. As part of the program -- the police development program -- there are periodic reviews that are underway and my colleagues who do that -- it's not
part of my general responsibility on the operating side of the house -- engage in reviews
on a six month basis both internally and with the government of Iraq. It was always our
plan to make adjustments to the police development program over time. But the
statement that somehow we have wasted or had everything pulled out from under us because of lack of a land use agreement is very simply false. For our other properties
in Iraq we have -- we have agreements for every single property we have in Iraq except
for one which is our interim facility in -- in Basra which is simply a reincarnation of a
former US military there. But even in that regard we have a longterm agreement that
was signed with the government of Iraq by Ambassador Negroponte in 2005 in which
we swapped properties with the government of Iraq and they are committed to provide
us with a ten acre facility in-in Basra of our mutal choosing. And so we are covered, sir.
that you were reading from about we are closing the Baghdad police development center because of a failure to have land use rights is simply factually incorrect. We have a land
use agreement for that site. As part of the program -- the police development program -- there are periodic reviews that are underway and my colleagues who do that -- it's not
part of my general responsibility on the operating side of the house -- engage in reviews
on a six month basis both internally and with the government of Iraq. It was always our
plan to make adjustments to the police development program over time. But the
statement that somehow we have wasted or had everything pulled out from under us because of lack of a land use agreement is very simply false. For our other properties
in Iraq we have -- we have agreements for every single property we have in Iraq except
for one which is our interim facility in -- in Basra which is simply a reincarnation of a
former US military there. But even in that regard we have a longterm agreement that
was signed with the government of Iraq by Ambassador Negroponte in 2005 in which
we swapped properties with the government of Iraq and they are committed to provide
us with a ten acre facility in-in Basra of our mutal choosing. And so we are covered, sir.
He said it. Too bad it wasn't accurate or, for that matter, truthful. We'll jump over to the second
panel.
panel.
Acting Chair Blake Farenthold: Mr. Courts, Ambassador Kennedy and I got into a
discussion about the absence of or presence of land use agreements for the facilities
we have in Iraq do you have the current status for that information from your latest
eport as to what facilities we do and do not have land use agreements for?
discussion about the absence of or presence of land use agreements for the facilities
we have in Iraq do you have the current status for that information from your latest
eport as to what facilities we do and do not have land use agreements for?
Michael Courts: What Ambassador Kennedy may have been referring to that for 13 of
the 14 facilities the Iraqis have acknowledged a presence through diplomatic notes.
But there's still only 5 of the 14 for which we actually have explicit title land use
agreements or leases.
the 14 facilities the Iraqis have acknowledged a presence through diplomatic notes.
But there's still only 5 of the 14 for which we actually have explicit title land use
agreements or leases.
Acting Chair Blake Farenthold: Alright so I'm not -- I'm not a diplomat. So what does
that mean? They say, "Oh, you can use it until we change our minds" -- is that
basically what those are? Or is there some force of law to those notes?
that mean? They say, "Oh, you can use it until we change our minds" -- is that
basically what those are? Or is there some force of law to those notes?
Michael Courts: Well the notes are definitely not the same thing as
having an explicit agreement. And as a matter of fact, there's already
been one case where the Iraqis
required us to reconfigure, downsize one of our sites. And that was at one of the
sites where we did not have a land use agreement and so obviously we're in a much
more vulnerable position when there's not an explicit agreement.
required us to reconfigure, downsize one of our sites. And that was at one of the
sites where we did not have a land use agreement and so obviously we're in a much
more vulnerable position when there's not an explicit agreement.
Acting Chair Blake Farenthold: Alright, Mr. Carroll, I would also like to follow up a
question I had on the last panel about the use of Iraqi nationals in overseeing some
of our investigations of it -- does that? I mean, what's your opinion that? Does that
strike you as a good idea, a bad idea or something we're stuck with because there's
no alternative? It seems like Americans would be a little more concerned about how
their tax dollars were spent than the Iraqi nationals who are the receipients of those
tax dollars. That's kind of a fox guarding the hen house, it looks like.
question I had on the last panel about the use of Iraqi nationals in overseeing some
of our investigations of it -- does that? I mean, what's your opinion that? Does that
strike you as a good idea, a bad idea or something we're stuck with because there's
no alternative? It seems like Americans would be a little more concerned about how
their tax dollars were spent than the Iraqi nationals who are the receipients of those
tax dollars. That's kind of a fox guarding the hen house, it looks like.
Michael Carroll: [Laughing] Well I-I personally I think it's a - like-like Ms. Rudman said
it's an additive sort of step. We would do the same thing. For example, in some of the
places where it's absolutely prohibited because of security what we will do is contract
with a local CPA firm -- primarily out of Egypt -- and do a very comprehensive agreed
upon procedures document that they will go out and they will take pictures, they will
ask questions, they will do what we would do if we could get there. So I think that it
what Mara is talking about as well. I don't see it as a problem. In fact, I see it as an
adjunct to and it's not a replacement for USAID contracting representatives and technical representatives actually getting out and ensuring that the work is actually being done.
That's not what these people are doing. What these people are doing is just going out,
doing some monitoring and observing. But it does not replace what the
responsibilities are for the Americans.
it's an additive sort of step. We would do the same thing. For example, in some of the
places where it's absolutely prohibited because of security what we will do is contract
with a local CPA firm -- primarily out of Egypt -- and do a very comprehensive agreed
upon procedures document that they will go out and they will take pictures, they will
ask questions, they will do what we would do if we could get there. So I think that it
what Mara is talking about as well. I don't see it as a problem. In fact, I see it as an
adjunct to and it's not a replacement for USAID contracting representatives and technical representatives actually getting out and ensuring that the work is actually being done.
That's not what these people are doing. What these people are doing is just going out,
doing some monitoring and observing. But it does not replace what the
responsibilities are for the Americans.
Acting Chair Blake Farenthold: Alright. Thank you very much. And I'm not sure if I
want to address this to Mr. Courts or Mr. Bowen -- whichever one of you seems
most eager to answer can take this. I haven't been to Iraq. My information in the
field of what it's like on the ground there is based on the things that I've read and
the reports that I've seen on television. But a good many of our facilities are in
metropolitan areas including the capital Baghdad and I'm concerned that we are
struggling getting food and water to these folks in a safe manner. I mean, what's
the procedure? Is the food delivered? How -- how is that handled and why is it a
problem in a metropolitan area? There are hundreds of thousands of people in
these cities, Iraqi nationals, that need to be fed. Obviously, it's more complicated
than just going down to the Safeway but I mean how is that handled? And why is it
such a problem?
want to address this to Mr. Courts or Mr. Bowen -- whichever one of you seems
most eager to answer can take this. I haven't been to Iraq. My information in the
field of what it's like on the ground there is based on the things that I've read and
the reports that I've seen on television. But a good many of our facilities are in
metropolitan areas including the capital Baghdad and I'm concerned that we are
struggling getting food and water to these folks in a safe manner. I mean, what's
the procedure? Is the food delivered? How -- how is that handled and why is it a
problem in a metropolitan area? There are hundreds of thousands of people in
these cities, Iraqi nationals, that need to be fed. Obviously, it's more complicated
than just going down to the Safeway but I mean how is that handled? And why is it
such a problem?
Stuart Bowen: The State Dept, as Ambassador Kennedy indicated,
continued the LOGCAP contract after the military withdrew in December
and thus the process for bringing food
into the country continued as well and that is via convoys that come up from Kuwait.
There have been challenges. That checkpoint has been occasionally closed. There
have been security challenges with regards to those convoys and other reasons that
the shipments have been intermittent and has led to an occasional shortage of certain
food stuff at the embassies. [Former US] Ambassador [to Iraq James] Jeffrey emphasized repeatedly this spring his desire to move towards local purchase but that's been slow.
into the country continued as well and that is via convoys that come up from Kuwait.
There have been challenges. That checkpoint has been occasionally closed. There
have been security challenges with regards to those convoys and other reasons that
the shipments have been intermittent and has led to an occasional shortage of certain
food stuff at the embassies. [Former US] Ambassador [to Iraq James] Jeffrey emphasized repeatedly this spring his desire to move towards local purchase but that's been slow.
Is it wrong to note that the State Dept's Patrick Kelly was not honest with the Subcommittee or
that he chose to ignore the questions asked? He wanted to insist (falsely) that there were leases
on all the Iraqi property currently occupied by the US diplomatic mission. Again, that is not truthful.
In addition, he wanted to insist that turning over a facility the US taxpayer had spent over a million
dollars on was normal and natural. It was neither. US taxpayers, if asked, might have said, "Hey,
turn it over to an Iraqi orphanage or youth project."
Or, noting the huge amount of widows due to the war, might have said, "Turn it over as a facility for women and their children to live in." But the same taxpayer that had no vote in whether or not to go to war got no vote in how to spend millions in Iraq..
that he chose to ignore the questions asked? He wanted to insist (falsely) that there were leases
on all the Iraqi property currently occupied by the US diplomatic mission. Again, that is not truthful.
In addition, he wanted to insist that turning over a facility the US taxpayer had spent over a million
dollars on was normal and natural. It was neither. US taxpayers, if asked, might have said, "Hey,
turn it over to an Iraqi orphanage or youth project."
Or, noting the huge amount of widows due to the war, might have said, "Turn it over as a facility for women and their children to live in." But the same taxpayer that had no vote in whether or not to go to war got no vote in how to spend millions in Iraq..
Patrick Kennedy declared, "It was always our plan to make adjustments to the police development program over time."
That actually may be true. (Or it may be another lie.) But the fact is, the US State Dept refused to share the plan with Congress or the office of the Special Inspector for General Reconstruction in Iraq. Kennedy might hope we forget that -- and certainly many in the press will rush to assist him -- but those of us present at the hearings held in the last months of 2011 remember the State Dept refusing to answer questions.
That actually may be true. (Or it may be another lie.) But the fact is, the US State Dept refused to share the plan with Congress or the office of the Special Inspector for General Reconstruction in Iraq. Kennedy might hope we forget that -- and certainly many in the press will rush to assist him -- but those of us present at the hearings held in the last months of 2011 remember the State Dept refusing to answer questions.
The State Dept is not an fiefdom, though Patrick Kennedy appears to believe it is. They are
answerable to Congress. It's a real shame that all these issues were not nailed down in real time.
If you're confused or playing stupid, the reason it was not nailed down is many Democrats agreed to give the White House a blank check and they weren't even concerned with what figure might be written in on that blank check. That's not just me. Let's note Stuart Bowen's testimony to the Subcommittee yesterday about the State Dept's refusal to provide concrete answers:
answerable to Congress. It's a real shame that all these issues were not nailed down in real time.
If you're confused or playing stupid, the reason it was not nailed down is many Democrats agreed to give the White House a blank check and they weren't even concerned with what figure might be written in on that blank check. That's not just me. Let's note Stuart Bowen's testimony to the Subcommittee yesterday about the State Dept's refusal to provide concrete answers:
Stuart Bowen: I testified before this subcommittee in November 2011 about our
concerns regarding the Department of State's planned multi-year, multi-billion-dollar
Police Development Program [PDP]. I raised two overarching issues that threatened
the PDP's success. First, the Defense Department had not adequately assessed the
impact of its own six-year police training efforts, and thus a key benchmark for
future planning was missing. And second, State had not sufficiently planned for the
program, either on the policy or logistical fronts. It is now beyond dispute that the
PDP planning process was insufficient. It should have produced specific program
goals, a time frame for accomplishing those goals, the anticipated total cost for the
program, the expected scope of required resources, and a method for measuring
progress. The process fell short in each of these areas. Further, to succeed, the
PDP required close collaboration and support from the Government of Iraq. But
the GOI's support has been weak, at best.
concerns regarding the Department of State's planned multi-year, multi-billion-dollar
Police Development Program [PDP]. I raised two overarching issues that threatened
the PDP's success. First, the Defense Department had not adequately assessed the
impact of its own six-year police training efforts, and thus a key benchmark for
future planning was missing. And second, State had not sufficiently planned for the
program, either on the policy or logistical fronts. It is now beyond dispute that the
PDP planning process was insufficient. It should have produced specific program
goals, a time frame for accomplishing those goals, the anticipated total cost for the
program, the expected scope of required resources, and a method for measuring
progress. The process fell short in each of these areas. Further, to succeed, the
PDP required close collaboration and support from the Government of Iraq. But
the GOI's support has been weak, at best.
That's why we have the problem we do now. In other comments? Tim Arango of the New York Times was attacked by the US State Dept for his writing. His writing ( "U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Police") was about what the State Dept was discussing.
He did not attempt to predict what would happen or how it would play out. We've already noted
Tim was correct and accurate in his reporting. We'll note that his reporting only stands stronger
after the Thursday hearing. If Victoria Nuland had any class or character, she'd apologize publicly
to Tim Arango for the attack she launched on him.
Before we go further, we should fall back to the last hearing Jason Chaffetz chaired that we
covered. That's December 7, 2011 and from that coverage, we'll note this:
covered. That's December 7, 2011 and from that coverage, we'll note this:
Subcommittee Chair Jason Chaffetz: Before recognizing Ranking Member [John]
Tierney, I'd like to note that the Defense Dept, State Dept, USAID and SIGAR will not
have IGs in January. In May of this year, I wrote the President asking him to move
without delay to appoint replacements. That letter was signed by Senators [Joe]
Lieberman, [Susan] Collins, [Claire] McCaskill and [Rob] Portman, as well as [House
Oversight Committee] Chairman [Darrell] Issa and Ranking Member [Elijah] Cummings
and Ranking Member Tierney. I'd like to place a copy of htis record into the record.
Without objection, so ordered. To my knowledge, the President has yet to nominate
any of these replacements, nor has he responded to this letter. I find that totally
unacceptable. This is a massive, massive effort. It's going to take some leadership
from the White House. These jobs cannot and will not be done if the president fails
to make these appointments. Upon taking office, President Obama promised that his administration would be "the most open and transparent in history." You cannot
achieve transparency without inspectors general. Again, I urge President Obama and
the Senate to nominate and confirm inspectors general to fill these vacancies and
without delay.
Tierney, I'd like to note that the Defense Dept, State Dept, USAID and SIGAR will not
have IGs in January. In May of this year, I wrote the President asking him to move
without delay to appoint replacements. That letter was signed by Senators [Joe]
Lieberman, [Susan] Collins, [Claire] McCaskill and [Rob] Portman, as well as [House
Oversight Committee] Chairman [Darrell] Issa and Ranking Member [Elijah] Cummings
and Ranking Member Tierney. I'd like to place a copy of htis record into the record.
Without objection, so ordered. To my knowledge, the President has yet to nominate
any of these replacements, nor has he responded to this letter. I find that totally
unacceptable. This is a massive, massive effort. It's going to take some leadership
from the White House. These jobs cannot and will not be done if the president fails
to make these appointments. Upon taking office, President Obama promised that his administration would be "the most open and transparent in history." You cannot
achieve transparency without inspectors general. Again, I urge President Obama and
the Senate to nominate and confirm inspectors general to fill these vacancies and
without delay.
Why is Geisel, who was at that hearing in December, billed as an "acting" anything? Is the White
House unable or just unwilling to fill these slots?
House unable or just unwilling to fill these slots?
Relations Committee was over Afghanistan in terms of subcommittees but never called a hearing
on the topic. Someone appears to love credits in the yearbook, they just don't want to work for them.
